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Abstract
Processing of the English language is overwhelmingly mainstream
in computational linguistics. This text claims that this situation is
neither healthy for computational linguistics nor theoretically tenable.
1 Introduction
One of the most interesting (empirical) facts of linguistics is that there are
many natural languages. Computational linguistics – either taken as the use
of computational tools to do linguistics, or as performing language tasks with
a computer – does not deal properly with this situation. In fact, it hardly
deals with it at all, because the overwhelming bulk of work is done on the
processing of English.
Imagine that only one disease were studied and published on medical
jounals, or one kind of drug in pharmaceutics, because doctors firmly believed
that all diseases were the same, or pharmacists that all drugs had the same
effect. Surely one could not expect that significant progress would take place
in either science? In fact, doctors cannot proceed on the basis “if this is
so for rabies, then it must be so for cholera!”, and neither can pharmacists
hold that “if this pill works for typhoid, then it works for meningitis as well”
without a strong empirical basis for their hypotheses. However, it appears
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to be common place in computational linguistics to utter “if this is true
of/works for English, it must be true of any language as well” and proceed
accordingly.
In my view, this is methodologically outrageous, completely undermining
the view of (computational) linguistics as an empirical science or proper
engineering.
This text will claim that languages are different on two accounts, both of
them relevant to our discipline. I start by pointing out some basic undeniable
facts and try to show that they lead to the conclusion that each language
has to be dealt with separately; then, I make the bolder claim that to prove
or disprove my assertion that languages are genuinely different in what they
convey – which not everyone would agree with – the only methodologically
sound way to proceed is to make no assumptions, and test whether, in the
end, languages serve (or do not) the very same ends.
2 A gentle overview of language differences
from a very practical point of view
For the moment, let us put aside any philosophical objections, and simply
underscore the following rather commonsensical observations:
• For language learning, proximity of languages is often a factor of signif-
icance. Closely related languages are easier for humans to learn than
totally unrelated ones. Also, to focus on the specific differences be-
tween the foreign language and the learner’s native one is a common
pedagogical tool.
• Frequency issues are commonly considered an important property of
language, of consequence both for language development (e.g. gram-
maticalization) and for language understanding (in infants). Now, it
is well known that frequency lists (of words, lemmata or grammatical
constructions) differ from one language to another.
• Grammar (for example, what is obligatory and what is optional) also
varies widely among languages. In fact, in this respect it is even more
enlightening to see how the grammar of even closely related languages
differs. As soon as something is obligatory, speakers have to make
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choices, even if they might not wish to. Their language forces (au-
tomatic) attention to features or concepts to which other languages
simply do not pay attention.
• The importance of metaphor in language is now almost universally
acknowledged. It is known that different languages function with dif-
ferent metaphors, therefore structuring knowledge and communication
in different ways. One clear example is spatial reasoning, which, al-
though basic in most natural languages, differs widely in the way it
is performed. A possibly degenerate example of this is the crucially
different use of spatial prepositions (or cases) when it comes down to
non-obvious cases.
All these observations seem to be good indications that languages are dif-
ferent, and common sense would have it that CL researchers should devote
a lot of work to deploy systems that work for different languages, and deal
properly with each language in its own terms.
However, sadly this is not so. What most people do when they are not
working on English is to take (developed for English) things off-the-shelf and
adapt them to their own language, without even questioning the rationale
of doing so. Then, they evaluate those tools in tasks devised for English,
again without questioning whether the tasks themselves make sense or are
well defined for their language. As I claimed in [5], when people apply tech-
niques and tools developed for English to other languages, they succeed or
fail exactly to the extent the langage is similar or different from English. This
is not very enlightening, if one expects or believes one is processing X, and
not English. As a result, we enter a vicious circle of English based language
processing from which it is impossible to extricate ourselves.
Let me adduce some examples from both computational linguistics and
linguistics proper (if this distinction makes any sense):
• Lexical ontologies. Last year I had a student presenting his project of
creating a lexical ontology for Portuguese to a Norwegian audience [7].
A heart-felt question or comment was: “Why Portuguese? Can’t your
work be more general?” I bet that George Miller and his colleagues
were never confronted with the question/objection in WordNet’s [4]
early days (or ever): “Why English?”
On the contrary, I even suspect that many NLP practitioners – es-
pecially native English speakers, but sadly not only – expected the
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opposite: now that WordNet exists, it exists for all languages (merely
a translation nuisance), and that it has come as a (bad) surprise that
so many people seem to be “redoing” the work or starting from scratch.
In fact, many authors still excuse themselves (or boast) that they are
using English WordNet for their own language, due to the unavailabil-
ity of the right one. This shows that they missed the whole point of
WordNet as a description of English (and not natural language) cate-
gorization: for any person acquainted with WordNet knows that it is
the empirical facts of English, not “natural categories” of any sort that
define WordNet’s synsets.
• Event classification. Another striking example of misappropriation
of excellent research for English into a general semantic framework
is the Vendlerian classification of events (achievements, activities, ac-
complishments) which [10] founded and explained in terms of English
grammatical categories. It has been imposed without crticism to all
other languages, as extensively discussed in [6]. While Vendler ex-
plicitly states that he is dealing with English, and even discusses the
philosophical question of using language data to do philosophy in [11,
page 5, my emphasis]:
even the linguistic data giving the structure of a particular
natural language are a fruitful source of genuine philosoph-
ical insight
we have seen this framework being applied (or simply adapted) to al-
most every other language on the planet!
• Question answering. This year at QA@CLEF, a crosslingual non-
English monolingual question answering evaluation contest, participat-
ing systems had to answer questions grouped by topic, and formulated
in a natural way, which meant anaphoric reference and context-based
questions. Even though the questions themselves were purposely fairly
similar, there was a wide range of differences when the four languages
German, Spanish, French and Portuguese formulated the questions [1].
Clearly, developers of QA for different languages will have to tackle dif-
ferent problems, and adapt their systems to the way people ask ques-
tions in their own languages, even if they are all addressing the ”same”
problem.
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In fact, few people would deny that different languages pose different prob-
lems to their computational processing (even if there were an underlying deep
similarity). But they tend to forget that this logically requires different at-
tention and effort in different areas for different languages in CL, as [9, page
144] say so well on the issue of creating evaluation resources:
data has to be collected for different languages, and the data has
to be comparable: however, if data is functionally comparable it
is not necessarily descriptively comparable (or vice versa), since
languages are intrinsically different
In other words, the task of identifying named entities would never be singled
out for processing German, nor would part of speech tagging be proposed as
a sensible module for Portuguese, although they made sense for English. To-
kenization or lemmatization are hard for Chinese and Hebrew, but are fairly
unproblematic for English. Classifiers, aspect and compounding, although it
is possible to find some (small) counterpart of those phenomena in English,
according to some scholars at least, are obviously not of utmost relevance
as compared to Japanese, Russian or Norwegian respectively. I think it is
fairly evident that no work on those matters in English alone will be able to
compensate for the effort required for these languages.
Let us consider the matter the other way around. If anyone does good
work on English processing, it is natural that they try to generalize their
technique to “language” – but this is often done without using proper criteria:
people consider the lexicon, or grammar, or both, as black boxes, and then
generalize the system to all languages, without due investigation into whether
the task still makes sense, the users still need it, and so on. In fact, this
“abstraction from English” procedure will make sense only to the extent the
language is similar to English.
Then there is yet another possible twist: one can construe “language” by
transferring most of English into it but disguising it as an abstract concept (as
[8] points out, this is often the case in knowledge representation formalisms
which use “English in disguise”). Again, any other natural language will only
be translatable into that formalism when it is similar enough to English, and
we have not advanced the computational processing of that language except
for (trivial) machine translation into English.
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3 A deeper problem
But now, imagine that it is not only a question of different details requiring
more processing than others, but that languages are also different in the
meaning they convey. For an excellent defence of such a position I refer the
reader to [2], and here I shall simply invoke [3, page 166]’s remark as to how
improbable it is that languages should convey the same thing:
it would surely be surprising, and a very strong empirical claim,
that different languages using different means to express ‘mean-
ings’ always arrived at exactly the same end.
In fact, there has never been any attempt to empirically confirm such a belief,
and I think it is high time to stress that we have strong empirical evidence
to the contrary. In translation, even when, in principle, one might be able to
say “the same”, human translators tend to make choices that either add or
remove content in order to conform to what is expected and implicit, or must
be made explicit in different languages. So far, there is no (computational)
system I know of that attributes the same meaning to two sides of a human
translation (or even attempts to do so).
All this should easily cast enough doubt on the possibility of maintaining
such a belief without any attempt at providing evidence for it. If people who
do computational linguistics adhere to such a creed, it is high time that they
should take this challenge seriously.
I am well aware that people who are convinced that “languages are just
a different arbitrary code for the same message”, which logically entails that
one would then simply transfer whatever is done for English to the language
of one’s choice (or vice-versa), will never take the above examples – or any
similar in kind – as relevant, because they work in a different paradigm in
Kuhn’s sense. For them, what is interesting is the abstract similarities, what
is common to all languages despite the differences (themselves a nuisance).
Specific details are swept aside as uninteresting, even if they happen to con-
cern English. And thus, once done (for English), there is nothing else to
publish on.
My (precisely opposite) position – namely, that features that are interest-
ing, or relevant to language processing, are not in any way related to features
that are “common to all languages”, and that we should accept that different
languages say different things, and so process each language independently
– has two specific advantages:
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1. these differences can be empirically validated or refuted – in other
words, they are falsifiable;
2. and the process ensures, from the start, a perfect fit for each language.
4 The current situation is too biased
Due to many unrelated factors, and also to a kind of snowball effect (the more
research is done on English, the more interesting and publishable is the work
done on English), English is uncontroversially the language of computational
linguistics. This is too narrow for a discipline that deals with handling natural
languages with computers, and leads to a severe bias in what is investigated
and implemented that would not occur if languages were treated (as scientific
objects of study) in an equal way.
We have seen that this is partially due to the common assumption that,
at a deep enough level, the same is, or can be, conveyed in any language. And
consequently, it is enough to do CL for one language, while others are trying
to uncover the way to go automatically to the other languages. However, let
us pause to admit that nobody has yet found that way.
One often hears a totally different kind of claim: that adapting work for
English to other languages is more cost effective than developing things from
scratch. But I have never seen such claims being backed by empirical data.
On the contrary, they are simply used as an argument to go that way in the
first place.
I believe it is time that we, as practitioners of this discipline, looked at
other languages without English eyes. That will be beneficial – I believe
– even to English language processing, because it is possible that different
problems or solutions will turn out to be applicable to English as well.
It is already far from irrelevant that one needs, in order to achieve inter-
national visibility in CL, to publish in English in our discipline (with the
automatically implicit preference for native speakers as authors). It is far too
much to require, and harmful to the area as a whole, that one must publish
on English as well.
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